Something went wrong. Try again.
Linux kernel mirror (for testing) git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Something went wrong. Try again.
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106107108109110111112113114115116117118119120121122123124125126127128129130131132133134135136137138139140141142143144145146147148149150151152153154155156157158159160161162163164165166167168169170171172173174175176177178179180181182183184185186187188189190191192193194195196197198199200201202203204205206207208209210211212213214215216217218219220221222223224225226227228229230231232233234235236237238239240241242243244245246247248249250251252253254255256257258259260261262263264265266267268269270271272273274275276277278279280281282283284285286287288289290291292293294295296297298299300301302303304305306307308309310311312313314315316317318319320321322323324325326327328329330331332333334335336337338339340341342343344345346347348349350351352353354355356357358359360361362363364365366367368369370371372373374375376377378379380381382383384385386387388389390391392393394395396397398399400401402403404405406407408409410411412413414415416417418419420421422423424425426427428429430431432433434435436437438439440441442443444445446447448449450451452453454455456457458459460461462463464465466467468469470471472473474475476477478479480481482483484485486487488489490491492493494495496497498499500501502503504505506507508509510511512513514515516517518519520521522523524525526527528529530531532533534535536537538539540541542543544545546547548549550551552553554555556557558559560561562563564565566567568569570571572573574575576577578579580581582583584585586587588589590591592593594595596597598599600601602603604605606607608609610611612613614615616617618619620621622623624625626627628629630631632633634635636637638639640641642643644645646647648649650651652653654655656657658659660661662663664665666667668669670671672673674675676677678679680681682683684685686687688689690691692693694695696697698699700701702703704705706707708709710711712713714715716717718719720721722723724725726727728729730731732733734735736737738739740741742743744745746747748749750751752753754755756757758759760761762763764765766767768769/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */#ifndef _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_#define _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_
#include <linux/bug.h>#include <linux/const.h>#include <linux/limits.h>
#define __FORTIFY_INLINE extern __always_inline __gnu_inline __overloadable#define __RENAME(x) __asm__(#x)
#define FORTIFY_REASON_DIR(r) ((r) & 1)#define FORTIFY_REASON_FUNC(r) ((r) >> 1)#define FORTIFY_REASON(func, write) ((func) << 1 | (write))
/* Overridden by KUnit tests. */#ifndef fortify_panic# define fortify_panic(func, write, avail, size, retfail) \ __fortify_panic(FORTIFY_REASON(func, write), avail, size)#endif#ifndef fortify_warn_once# define fortify_warn_once(x...) WARN_ONCE(x)#endif
#define FORTIFY_READ 0#define FORTIFY_WRITE 1
#define EACH_FORTIFY_FUNC(macro) \ macro(strnlen), \ macro(strlen), \ macro(strscpy), \ macro(strlcat), \ macro(strcat), \ macro(strncat), \ macro(memset), \ macro(memcpy), \ macro(memmove), \ macro(memscan), \ macro(memcmp), \ macro(memchr), \ macro(memchr_inv), \ macro(kmemdup), \ macro(strcpy), \ macro(UNKNOWN),
#define MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC(func) FORTIFY_FUNC_##func
enum fortify_func { EACH_FORTIFY_FUNC(MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC)};
void __fortify_report(const u8 reason, const size_t avail, const size_t size);void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason, const size_t avail, const size_t size) __cold __noreturn;void __read_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)");void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object (2nd parameter)");void __read_overflow2_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("detected read beyond size of field (2nd parameter); maybe use struct_group()?");void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object (1st parameter)");void __write_overflow_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe use struct_group()?");
#define __compiletime_strlen(p) \({ \ char *__p = (char *)(p); \ size_t __ret = SIZE_MAX; \ const size_t __p_size = __member_size(p); \ if (__p_size != SIZE_MAX && \ __builtin_constant_p(*__p)) { \ size_t __p_len = __p_size - 1; \ if (__builtin_constant_p(__p[__p_len]) && \ __p[__p_len] == '\0') \ __ret = __builtin_strlen(__p); \ } \ __ret; \})
#if defined(__SANITIZE_ADDRESS__)
#if !defined(CONFIG_CC_HAS_KASAN_MEMINTRINSIC_PREFIX) && !defined(CONFIG_GENERIC_ENTRY)extern void *__underlying_memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memset);extern void *__underlying_memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memmove);extern void *__underlying_memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcpy);#elif defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)extern void *__underlying_memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(__asan_memset);extern void *__underlying_memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(__asan_memmove);extern void *__underlying_memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(__asan_memcpy);#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */extern void *__underlying_memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(__hwasan_memset);extern void *__underlying_memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(__hwasan_memmove);extern void *__underlying_memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(__hwasan_memcpy);#endif
extern void *__underlying_memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memchr);extern int __underlying_memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcmp);extern char *__underlying_strcat(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcat);extern char *__underlying_strcpy(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcpy);extern __kernel_size_t __underlying_strlen(const char *p) __RENAME(strlen);extern char *__underlying_strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count) __RENAME(strncat);#else
#if defined(__SANITIZE_MEMORY__)/* * For KMSAN builds all memcpy/memset/memmove calls should be replaced by the * corresponding __msan_XXX functions. */#include <linux/kmsan_string.h>#define __underlying_memcpy __msan_memcpy#define __underlying_memmove __msan_memmove#define __underlying_memset __msan_memset#else#define __underlying_memcpy __builtin_memcpy#define __underlying_memmove __builtin_memmove#define __underlying_memset __builtin_memset#endif
#define __underlying_memchr __builtin_memchr#define __underlying_memcmp __builtin_memcmp#define __underlying_strcat __builtin_strcat#define __underlying_strcpy __builtin_strcpy#define __underlying_strlen __builtin_strlen#define __underlying_strncat __builtin_strncat
#endif
/** * unsafe_memcpy - memcpy implementation with no FORTIFY bounds checking * * @dst: Destination memory address to write to * @src: Source memory address to read from * @bytes: How many bytes to write to @dst from @src * @justification: Free-form text or comment describing why the use is needed * * This should be used for corner cases where the compiler cannot do the * right thing, or during transitions between APIs, etc. It should be used * very rarely, and includes a place for justification detailing where bounds * checking has happened, and why existing solutions cannot be employed. */#define unsafe_memcpy(dst, src, bytes, justification) \ __underlying_memcpy(dst, src, bytes)
/* * Clang's use of __builtin_*object_size() within inlines needs hinting via * __pass_*object_size(). The preference is to only ever use type 1 (member * size, rather than struct size), but there remain some stragglers using * type 0 that will be converted in the future. */#if __has_builtin(__builtin_dynamic_object_size)#define POS __pass_dynamic_object_size(1)#define POS0 __pass_dynamic_object_size(0)#else#define POS __pass_object_size(1)#define POS0 __pass_object_size(0)#endif
#define __compiletime_lessthan(bounds, length) ( \ __builtin_constant_p((bounds) < (length)) && \ (bounds) < (length) \)
extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen);/** * strnlen - Return bounded count of characters in a NUL-terminated string * * @p: pointer to NUL-terminated string to count. * @maxlen: maximum number of characters to count. * * Returns number of characters in @p (NOT including the final NUL), or * @maxlen, if no NUL has been found up to there. * */__FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size_t maxlen){ const size_t p_size = __member_size(p); const size_t p_len = __compiletime_strlen(p); size_t ret;
/* We can take compile-time actions when maxlen is const. */ if (__builtin_constant_p(maxlen) && p_len != SIZE_MAX) { /* If p is const, we can use its compile-time-known len. */ if (maxlen >= p_size) return p_len; }
/* Do not check characters beyond the end of p. */ ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size); if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret) fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strnlen, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, ret + 1, ret); return ret;}
/* * Defined after fortified strnlen to reuse it. However, it must still be * possible for strlen() to be used on compile-time strings for use in * static initializers (i.e. as a constant expression). *//** * strlen - Return count of characters in a NUL-terminated string * * @p: pointer to NUL-terminated string to count. * * Do not use this function unless the string length is known at * compile-time. When @p is unterminated, this function may crash * or return unexpected counts that could lead to memory content * exposures. Prefer strnlen(). * * Returns number of characters in @p (NOT including the final NUL). * */#define strlen(p) \ __builtin_choose_expr(__is_constexpr(__builtin_strlen(p)), \ __builtin_strlen(p), __fortify_strlen(p))__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strlen, 1)__kernel_size_t __fortify_strlen(const char * const POS p){ const size_t p_size = __member_size(p); __kernel_size_t ret;
/* Give up if we don't know how large p is. */ if (p_size == SIZE_MAX) return __underlying_strlen(p); ret = strnlen(p, p_size); if (p_size <= ret) fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlen, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, ret + 1, ret); return ret;}
/* Defined after fortified strnlen() to reuse it. */extern ssize_t __real_strscpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(sized_strscpy);__FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t sized_strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t size){ /* Use string size rather than possible enclosing struct size. */ const size_t p_size = __member_size(p); const size_t q_size = __member_size(q); size_t len;
/* If we cannot get size of p and q default to call strscpy. */ if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX) return __real_strscpy(p, q, size);
/* * If size can be known at compile time and is greater than * p_size, generate a compile time write overflow error. */ if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __write_overflow();
/* Short-circuit for compile-time known-safe lengths. */ if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, SIZE_MAX)) { len = __compiletime_strlen(q);
if (len < SIZE_MAX && __compiletime_lessthan(len, size)) { __underlying_memcpy(p, q, len + 1); return len; } }
/* * This call protects from read overflow, because len will default to q * length if it smaller than size. */ len = strnlen(q, size); /* * If len equals size, we will copy only size bytes which leads to * -E2BIG being returned. * Otherwise we will copy len + 1 because of the final '\O'. */ len = len == size ? size : len + 1;
/* * Generate a runtime write overflow error if len is greater than * p_size. */ if (p_size < len) fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strscpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, len, -E2BIG);
/* * We can now safely call vanilla strscpy because we are protected from: * 1. Read overflow thanks to call to strnlen(). * 2. Write overflow thanks to above ifs. */ return __real_strscpy(p, q, len);}
/* Defined after fortified strlen() to reuse it. */extern size_t __real_strlcat(char *p, const char *q, size_t avail) __RENAME(strlcat);/** * strlcat - Append a string to an existing string * * @p: pointer to %NUL-terminated string to append to * @q: pointer to %NUL-terminated string to append from * @avail: Maximum bytes available in @p * * Appends %NUL-terminated string @q after the %NUL-terminated * string at @p, but will not write beyond @avail bytes total, * potentially truncating the copy from @q. @p will stay * %NUL-terminated only if a %NUL already existed within * the @avail bytes of @p. If so, the resulting number of * bytes copied from @q will be at most "@avail - strlen(@p) - 1". * * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid * read and write overflows, this is only possible when the sizes * of @p and @q are known to the compiler. Prefer building the * string with formatting, via scnprintf(), seq_buf, or similar. * * Returns total bytes that _would_ have been contained by @p * regardless of truncation, similar to snprintf(). If return * value is >= @avail, the string has been truncated. * */__FORTIFY_INLINEsize_t strlcat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t avail){ const size_t p_size = __member_size(p); const size_t q_size = __member_size(q); size_t p_len, copy_len; size_t actual, wanted;
/* Give up immediately if both buffer sizes are unknown. */ if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX) return __real_strlcat(p, q, avail);
p_len = strnlen(p, avail); copy_len = strlen(q); wanted = actual = p_len + copy_len;
/* Cannot append any more: report truncation. */ if (avail <= p_len) return wanted;
/* Give up if string is already overflowed. */ if (p_size <= p_len) fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, p_len + 1, wanted);
if (actual >= avail) { copy_len = avail - p_len - 1; actual = p_len + copy_len; }
/* Give up if copy will overflow. */ if (p_size <= actual) fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, actual + 1, wanted); __underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len); p[actual] = '\0';
return wanted;}
/* Defined after fortified strlcat() to reuse it. *//** * strcat - Append a string to an existing string * * @p: pointer to NUL-terminated string to append to * @q: pointer to NUL-terminated source string to append from * * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid * read and write overflows, this is only possible when the * destination buffer size is known to the compiler. Prefer * building the string with formatting, via scnprintf() or similar. * At the very least, use strncat(). * * Returns @p. * */__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcat, 1, 2)char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q){ const size_t p_size = __member_size(p); const size_t wanted = strlcat(p, q, p_size);
if (p_size <= wanted) fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, wanted + 1, p); return p;}
/** * strncat - Append a string to an existing string * * @p: pointer to NUL-terminated string to append to * @q: pointer to source string to append from * @count: Maximum bytes to read from @q * * Appends at most @count bytes from @q (stopping at the first * NUL byte) after the NUL-terminated string at @p. @p will be * NUL-terminated. * * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid * read and write overflows, this is only possible when the sizes * of @p and @q are known to the compiler. Prefer building the * string with formatting, via scnprintf() or similar. * * Returns @p. * *//* Defined after fortified strlen() and strnlen() to reuse them. */__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strncat, 1, 2, 3)char *strncat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, __kernel_size_t count){ const size_t p_size = __member_size(p); const size_t q_size = __member_size(q); size_t p_len, copy_len, total;
if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX) return __underlying_strncat(p, q, count); p_len = strlen(p); copy_len = strnlen(q, count); total = p_len + copy_len + 1; if (p_size < total) fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, total, p); __underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len); p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0'; return p;}
__FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size, const size_t p_size, const size_t p_size_field){ if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) { /* * Length argument is a constant expression, so we * can perform compile-time bounds checking where * buffer sizes are also known at compile time. */
/* Error when size is larger than enclosing struct. */ if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size_field, p_size) && __compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __write_overflow();
/* Warn when write size is larger than dest field. */ if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size_field, size)) __write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size); } /* * At this point, length argument may not be a constant expression, * so run-time bounds checking can be done where buffer sizes are * known. (This is not an "else" because the above checks may only * be compile-time warnings, and we want to still warn for run-time * overflows.) */
/* * Always stop accesses beyond the struct that contains the * field, when the buffer's remaining size is known. * (The SIZE_MAX test is to optimize away checks where the buffer * lengths are unknown.) */ if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size) fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memset, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, size, true); return false;}
#define __fortify_memset_chk(p, c, size, p_size, p_size_field) ({ \ size_t __fortify_size = (size_t)(size); \ fortify_memset_chk(__fortify_size, p_size, p_size_field), \ __underlying_memset(p, c, __fortify_size); \})
/* * __struct_size() vs __member_size() must be captured here to avoid * evaluating argument side-effects further into the macro layers. */#ifndef CONFIG_KMSAN#define memset(p, c, s) __fortify_memset_chk(p, c, s, \ __struct_size(p), __member_size(p))#endif
/* * To make sure the compiler can enforce protection against buffer overflows, * memcpy(), memmove(), and memset() must not be used beyond individual * struct members. If you need to copy across multiple members, please use * struct_group() to create a named mirror of an anonymous struct union. * (e.g. see struct sk_buff.) Read overflow checking is currently only * done when a write overflow is also present, or when building with W=1. * * Mitigation coverage matrix * Bounds checking at: * +-------+-------+-------+-------+ * | Compile time | Run time | * memcpy() argument sizes: | write | read | write | read | * dest source length +-------+-------+-------+-------+ * memcpy(known, known, constant) | y | y | n/a | n/a | * memcpy(known, unknown, constant) | y | n | n/a | V | * memcpy(known, known, dynamic) | n | n | B | B | * memcpy(known, unknown, dynamic) | n | n | B | V | * memcpy(unknown, known, constant) | n | y | V | n/a | * memcpy(unknown, unknown, constant) | n | n | V | V | * memcpy(unknown, known, dynamic) | n | n | V | B | * memcpy(unknown, unknown, dynamic) | n | n | V | V | * +-------+-------+-------+-------+ * * y = perform deterministic compile-time bounds checking * n = cannot perform deterministic compile-time bounds checking * n/a = no run-time bounds checking needed since compile-time deterministic * B = can perform run-time bounds checking (currently unimplemented) * V = vulnerable to run-time overflow (will need refactoring to solve) * */__FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size, const size_t p_size, const size_t q_size, const size_t p_size_field, const size_t q_size_field, const u8 func){ if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) { /* * Length argument is a constant expression, so we * can perform compile-time bounds checking where * buffer sizes are also known at compile time. */
/* Error when size is larger than enclosing struct. */ if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size_field, p_size) && __compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __write_overflow(); if (__compiletime_lessthan(q_size_field, q_size) && __compiletime_lessthan(q_size, size)) __read_overflow2();
/* Warn when write size argument larger than dest field. */ if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size_field, size)) __write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size); /* * Warn for source field over-read when building with W=1 * or when an over-write happened, so both can be fixed at * the same time. */ if ((IS_ENABLED(KBUILD_EXTRA_WARN1) || __compiletime_lessthan(p_size_field, size)) && __compiletime_lessthan(q_size_field, size)) __read_overflow2_field(q_size_field, size); } /* * At this point, length argument may not be a constant expression, * so run-time bounds checking can be done where buffer sizes are * known. (This is not an "else" because the above checks may only * be compile-time warnings, and we want to still warn for run-time * overflows.) */
/* * Always stop accesses beyond the struct that contains the * field, when the buffer's remaining size is known. * (The SIZE_MAX test is to optimize away checks where the buffer * lengths are unknown.) */ if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size) fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, size, true); else if (q_size != SIZE_MAX && q_size < size) fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_READ, q_size, size, true);
/* * Warn when writing beyond destination field size. * * Note the implementation of __builtin_*object_size() behaves * like sizeof() when not directly referencing a flexible * array member, which means there will be many bounds checks * that will appear at run-time, without a way for them to be * detected at compile-time (as can be done when the destination * is specifically the flexible array member). * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=101832 */ if (p_size_field != SIZE_MAX && p_size != p_size_field && p_size_field < size) return true;
return false;}
/* * To work around what seems to be an optimizer bug, the macro arguments * need to have const copies or the values end up changed by the time they * reach fortify_warn_once(). See commit 6f7630b1b5bc ("fortify: Capture * __bos() results in const temp vars") for more details. */#define __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, size, p_size, q_size, \ p_size_field, q_size_field, op) ({ \ const size_t __fortify_size = (size_t)(size); \ const size_t __p_size = (p_size); \ const size_t __q_size = (q_size); \ const size_t __p_size_field = (p_size_field); \ const size_t __q_size_field = (q_size_field); \ /* Keep a mutable version of the size for the final copy. */ \ size_t __copy_size = __fortify_size; \ fortify_warn_once(fortify_memcpy_chk(__fortify_size, __p_size, \ __q_size, __p_size_field, \ __q_size_field, FORTIFY_FUNC_ ##op), \ #op ": detected field-spanning write (size %zu) of single %s (size %zu)\n", \ __fortify_size, \ "field \"" #p "\" at " FILE_LINE, \ __p_size_field); \ /* Hide only the run-time size from value range tracking to */ \ /* silence compile-time false positive bounds warnings. */ \ if (!__builtin_constant_p(__copy_size)) \ OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(__copy_size); \ __underlying_##op(p, q, __copy_size); \})
/* * Notes about compile-time buffer size detection: * * With these types... * * struct middle { * u16 a; * u8 middle_buf[16]; * int b; * }; * struct end { * u16 a; * u8 end_buf[16]; * }; * struct flex { * int a; * u8 flex_buf[]; * }; * * void func(TYPE *ptr) { ... } * * Cases where destination size cannot be currently detected: * - the size of ptr's object (seemingly by design, gcc & clang fail): * __builtin_object_size(ptr, 1) == SIZE_MAX * - the size of flexible arrays in ptr's obj (by design, dynamic size): * __builtin_object_size(ptr->flex_buf, 1) == SIZE_MAX * - the size of ANY array at the end of ptr's obj (gcc and clang bug): * __builtin_object_size(ptr->end_buf, 1) == SIZE_MAX * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=101836 * * Cases where destination size is currently detected: * - the size of non-array members within ptr's object: * __builtin_object_size(ptr->a, 1) == 2 * - the size of non-flexible-array in the middle of ptr's obj: * __builtin_object_size(ptr->middle_buf, 1) == 16 * */
/* * __struct_size() vs __member_size() must be captured here to avoid * evaluating argument side-effects further into the macro layers. */#define memcpy(p, q, s) __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s, \ __struct_size(p), __struct_size(q), \ __member_size(p), __member_size(q), \ memcpy)#define memmove(p, q, s) __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s, \ __struct_size(p), __struct_size(q), \ __member_size(p), __member_size(q), \ memmove)
extern void *__real_memscan(void *, int, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(memscan);__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memscan(void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size){ const size_t p_size = __struct_size(p);
if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memscan, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, NULL); return __real_memscan(p, c, size);}
__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_memcmp, 1, 2, 3)int memcmp(const void * const POS0 p, const void * const POS0 q, __kernel_size_t size){ const size_t p_size = __struct_size(p); const size_t q_size = __struct_size(q);
if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) { if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (__compiletime_lessthan(q_size, size)) __read_overflow2(); } if (p_size < size) fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, INT_MIN); else if (q_size < size) fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp, FORTIFY_READ, q_size, size, INT_MIN); return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size);}
__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_memchr, 1, 2, 3)void *memchr(const void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size){ const size_t p_size = __struct_size(p);
if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, NULL); return __underlying_memchr(p, c, size);}
void *__real_memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, size_t n) __RENAME(memchr_inv);__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void * const POS0 p, int c, size_t size){ const size_t p_size = __struct_size(p);
if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr_inv, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, NULL); return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size);}
extern void *__real_kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) __RENAME(kmemdup_noprof) __realloc_size(2);__FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup_noprof(const void * const POS0 p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp){ const size_t p_size = __struct_size(p);
if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_kmemdup, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, __real_kmemdup(p, 0, gfp)); return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp);}#define kmemdup(...) alloc_hooks(kmemdup_noprof(__VA_ARGS__))
/** * strcpy - Copy a string into another string buffer * * @p: pointer to destination of copy * @q: pointer to NUL-terminated source string to copy * * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid * overflows, this is only possible when the sizes of @q and @p are * known to the compiler. Prefer strscpy(), though note its different * return values for detecting truncation. * * Returns @p. * *//* Defined after fortified strlen to reuse it. */__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcpy, 1, 2)char *strcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q){ const size_t p_size = __member_size(p); const size_t q_size = __member_size(q); size_t size;
/* If neither buffer size is known, immediately give up. */ if (__builtin_constant_p(p_size) && __builtin_constant_p(q_size) && p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX) return __underlying_strcpy(p, q); size = strlen(q) + 1; /* Compile-time check for const size overflow. */ if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __write_overflow(); /* Run-time check for dynamic size overflow. */ if (p_size < size) fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, size, p); __underlying_memcpy(p, q, size); return p;}
/* Don't use these outside the FORITFY_SOURCE implementation */#undef __underlying_memchr#undef __underlying_memcmp#undef __underlying_strcat#undef __underlying_strcpy#undef __underlying_strlen#undef __underlying_strncat
#undef POS#undef POS0
#endif /* _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_ */