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(I'm so sorry!) Linux kernel mirror (for testing) git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
kernel os linux
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/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be changed from user-level. */#define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X))
#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is 0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the effective (legacy) bit of the executable file. */#define SECURE_NOROOT 0#define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED 1 /* make bit-0 immutable */
#define SECBIT_NOROOT (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT))#define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED))
/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup". When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause capabilities to be gained/lost. */#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED 3 /* make bit-2 immutable */
#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \ (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED))
/* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d child can use this feature again. */#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS 4#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED 5 /* make bit-4 immutable */
#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
/* When set, a process cannot add new capabilities to its ambient set. */#define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 6#define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED 7 /* make bit-6 immutable */
#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE))#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED \ (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED))
/* See Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst */#define SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE 8#define SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED 9 /* make bit-8 immutable */
#define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE))#define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED \ (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED))
/* See Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst */#define SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE 10#define SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED 11 /* make bit-10 immutable */
#define SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE \ (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))#define SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED \ (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED))
#define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \ issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \ issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) | \ issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE) | \ issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE) | \ issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
#define SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE) | \ issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */