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(I'm so sorry!) Linux kernel mirror (for testing) git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
kernel os linux
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123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106107108109110111112113114115116117118119120121122123124125126127128129130131132133134135136137138139140141142143144145146147148149150151152153154155156157158159160161162163164165166167168169170171172173174175176177178179180181182183184185186187188189190191192193194195196197198199200201202203204205206207208209210211212213214215216217218219220221222223224225226/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 *//* * This is <linux/capability.h> * * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no> * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main. * * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance): * * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/ */#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>#include <linux/uidgid.h>#include <linux/bits.h>
#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
extern int file_caps_enabled;
typedef struct { u64 val; } kernel_cap_t;
/* same as vfs_ns_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */struct cpu_vfs_cap_data { __u32 magic_etc; kuid_t rootid; kernel_cap_t permitted; kernel_cap_t inheritable;};
#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
struct file;struct inode;struct dentry;struct task_struct;struct user_namespace;struct mnt_idmap;
/* * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS: * * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant. * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. * * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs. * * We could also define fsmask as follows: * 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions * 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions */
# define CAP_FS_MASK (BIT_ULL(CAP_CHOWN) \ | BIT_ULL(CAP_MKNOD) \ | BIT_ULL(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \ | BIT_ULL(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \ | BIT_ULL(CAP_FOWNER) \ | BIT_ULL(CAP_FSETID) \ | BIT_ULL(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))#define CAP_VALID_MASK (BIT_ULL(CAP_LAST_CAP+1)-1)
# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t) { 0 })# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t) { CAP_VALID_MASK })# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t) { CAP_FS_MASK | BIT_ULL(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) })# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t) { CAP_FS_MASK | BIT_ULL(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) })
# define cap_clear(c) do { (c).val = 0; } while (0)
#define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).val |= BIT_ULL(flag))#define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).val &= ~BIT_ULL(flag))#define cap_raised(c, flag) (((c).val & BIT_ULL(flag)) != 0)
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t b){ return (kernel_cap_t) { a.val | b.val };}
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t b){ return (kernel_cap_t) { a.val & b.val };}
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t drop){ return (kernel_cap_t) { a.val &~ drop.val };}
static inline bool cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a){ return !a.val;}
static inline bool cap_isidentical(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t b){ return a.val == b.val;}
/* * Check if "a" is a subset of "set". * return true if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set" * cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return true * return false if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set" * cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return false */static inline bool cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set){ return !(a.val & ~set.val);}
/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a){ return cap_drop(a, CAP_FS_SET);}
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t permitted){ return cap_combine(a, cap_intersect(permitted, CAP_FS_SET));}
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a){ return cap_drop(a, CAP_NFSD_SET);}
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t permitted){ return cap_combine(a, cap_intersect(permitted, CAP_NFSD_SET));}
#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSERextern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);extern bool capable(int cap);bool capable_noaudit(int cap);extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);extern bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);#elsestatic inline bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap){ return true;}static inline bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap){ return true;}static inline bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap){ return true;}static inline bool capable(int cap){ return true;}static inline bool capable_noaudit(int cap){ return true;}static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap){ return true;}static inline bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap){ return true;}static inline bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap){ return true;}#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct inode *inode);bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct inode *inode, int cap);extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);static inline bool perfmon_capable(void){ return capable(CAP_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);}
static inline bool bpf_capable(void){ return capable(CAP_BPF) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);}
static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns){ return ns_capable(ns, CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) || ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);}
static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns){ return ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) || ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);}
/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
int cap_convert_nscap(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const void **ivalue, size_t size);
#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */